The Bundeswehr was in Afghanistan for a good 20 years. As part of the NATO missions ISAF and “Resolute Support”, they fought with other armed forces under the leadership of the USA and alongside the Afghan government army against the insurgent Taliban. At the same time, it should contribute to the development of freedom, democracy and human rights in Afghanistan.
But despite the massive deployment of material, money and personnel, the West and thus also the Bundeswehr could not prevent the Taliban from taking power again. After the final withdrawal of NATO forces in the summer of 2021 – American soldiers were the last to leave the country on August 30 – the Taliban no longer had any serious opponents.
Taliban fighters celebrate the first anniversary of taking power in Kabul on August 15, 2022
So what went wrong during those 20 years? Finding out is the task of the Commission of Inquiry on the Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission, which was set up last week. In contrast to the parliamentary Afghanistan investigative committee set up in the summer, which is dealing with the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr and the evacuation of German personnel, local staff and other people affected, the commission of inquiry is analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the entire operation. The aim of the 24 committee members – half MPs, half experts – is to draw lessons for future German foreign and security policy from the findings.
“How could that happen?”
“It is our aim to examine the political mandate and the work of the government and parliament in a self-critical manner and in cooperation with the actors,” Michael Müller (SPD), chairman of the commission, told DW. “Above all, we want to gain an insight into how the actors on the ground worked together and what chance they had to fulfill their mission.”
Flourishing Koran schools in the face of blocked educational paths for girls
We also owe the Afghans insight, says Schahina Gambir, who represents Alliance 90/The Greens on the commission. “The clocks went back in Afghanistan in August 2021,” Gambir told DW. “This is especially true for women and girls: Half of the population is not visible on the Afghan streets. The minorities are in danger again. We have returned to the situation we were in 20 years ago. How could that happen? We all need to be enlightened Guilty of those involved, the Afghans as well as those who have been involved in the country in so many different ways over the years.”
According to initial findings, there were very different types of weaknesses. One was due to the fact that the Bundeswehr acted within the framework of international umbrella mandates, says Serap Güler (CDU), the deputy chair of the commission. “This took away Germany’s chance to participate in the goals and missions and to ask relevant questions about the goals of the missions. Instead, Germany adopted the specifications one-to-one,” Güler told DW.
“Unreachable Goals”
In fact, the guidelines and goals were often formulated unclearly and have become more and more comprehensive over time, notes political scientist Ursula Schröder, who advises the commission as an expert. “The mission began as an anti-terrorist operation and was then to achieve other goals, including state-building and peacebuilding.” According to the director of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, that couldn’t work. “Because it is important to clearly design realistic goals and to continuously check their implementation. This check did not exist. It was not sufficiently clear that some goals were unattainable. If that is the case, interventions inevitably fail.”
Ceremony marking the end of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan, in which 59 soldiers lost their lives
Beyond unclear specifications and a lack of revision, the mission faced enormous site-specific problems, Schröder continued. “It is very clear from research that it is difficult, and in some cases impossible, to externally construct a complex state and social order in a country weakened by violence, conflict and poor governance.” This also applies to Afghanistan. “The country has been shaken in every respect by the long war and the associated violence. State building is extremely difficult in this environment.”
Lack of knowledge of the country and its people
It is possible that the country’s political and historical context was not sufficiently dealt with, says Michael Müller. This contributed to the fact that the successes of the mission were very limited in terms of space. “We have to admit that what was successful in Kabul has not succeeded in large parts of the country. This is probably also due to the fact that the people in rural areas have few connections to their government, to those responsible in Afghanistan, and little had confidence.”
Everyday life under the Taliban: Women in Kabul wait for food aid to be distributed
The poor government performance may well have contributed to the failure of the mission, says Serap Güler. If decisive government services fail, the people can no longer be reached for the principles of progressive politics. “In such a situation, many people simply have other concerns,” says Güler. “They have to see that they have enough to eat, that their children get an education, that they generally meet their material needs. All of this creates such pressure under the local circumstances that ideas like the rule of law or democracy seem relatively abstract. People need concrete experience of what these standards mean and what they are useful for. Then they can do something with them.”
Too little attention was paid to the civilian population, and Shahina Gambir has the same impression. “We have to examine very clearly to what extent the Afghan people and civil society were involved. Was our understanding of democracy and the rule of law simply forced on them? Did our goals coincide with those of Afghan society? Questions of this kind should also be very important for the future.”
